"To Plea or Not to Plea"
Q:"Should I plea to something I did not do?"
A: Let's start by setting aside both the idea that a sweeping answer would apply, or that anyone but you would have to decide (attorneys can advise, but accepting a plea (whether or not you privately disclaim its (factually plead to) conduct) is your decision), this most frequently asked question also borrows from a misleading premise: One that suggests a "criminal conviction" or a "guilty plea" and the (actual) commission of a crime are one in the same, but they are not...
Whether or not you did what you are accused of is unquestionably important… It speaks to truth.
A criminal conviction on the other hand, is something else: It's a conclusion (by verdict or plea) in the context of a "criminal proceeding" (i.e., a forum with a set of rules that requires lawfully obtained "evidence" to be used to prove to a fact finder (i.e., a dozen strangers or the court itself) that the accused committed every required element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
But this is wholly distinguishable from truth: truth does not rely on tangible "evidence" to validate it: it need not be "proved;" and it doesn't require others to "establish" it, or pronounce "findings of facts" about it, let alone believe it... In other words, what truthfully happened at one time does not change simply because a fact finder insists that it hasn't been "proved" to whatever standard at a later time (e.g., if you sang in the shower yesterday, you may not be able to prove it next week; but that doesn't mean it didn't happen).
A criminal conviction by contrast, depends on "proving" something happened, either by a fact finder's determination in a verdict or established with the defendant's factual basis in the context of a plea. And this clearly requires reliance on "evidence," as much as it does the conclusions drawn by those exposed to it (i.e., those charged with "fact finding" or interpreting a set of presented circumstances, then concluding what they believe to have happened) --and it's the object of those conclusions that are called "facts."
But there is a meaningful difference between reliance on "proof" (let alone the conclusions drawn by those exposed to it), and the object that the evidence, as used by the parties supposedly "proves." Simply stated, there's a difference between what truthfully happened (i.e., whether you committed the charged offense), and what can be "proved" by people standing before others, using "evidence" to support the allegation that you did (this latter function is also known as trying to "convince" others).
With this difference in mind, and in the spirit of being truthful, when deciding whether to accept an offered plea (as opposed to proceeding to trial, which would be the alternative --in the absence of a dismissal or suspended proceeding), the question should not only be "did you commit the underlying offense;" but rather, it should also include an assessment that speaks to the likelihood that a criminal charge would result in its conviction. This should prompt a legally competent examination to determine whether there "appears" to be enough evidence to convince a fact finder of its commission... Ironically, but not surprisingly, it requires a truthful assessment as to whether it appears that a charge (allegations drawn from an observable account) can be "proved" beyond a reasonable doubt --in light of all the relevant circumstances and evidence presented. Then pose that conclusion against the cost of accepting an offered plea (i.e., the effect of you pleading legally guilty to another presumably lesser offense than the one charged (a "lesser offense" in the sense that it would be the benefit conferred to you from the prosecutor's exercised legal detriment of forfeiting their right to charge you with more (and /or more severe) charge(s) --which typically informs a Defendant's incentive to plea), and you arrive at a very basic legal recommendation as to whether or not you should accept an offered plea.
Note, this is stripped to an almost structural consideration of posing different consequences against each other. Indeed, there's much more there than this that has an effect on your case: Instinct (not impulse), feeling, whether your attorney doubts your description of events, whether you and/or your attorney doubt that you can prevail, and of course, if you committed the charged offense (although many people don't realize it, these things also come through loudly, as does the truth).
Plea bargain considerations
Q: What legal/practical circumstances are relevant when examining the likelihood that a criminal charge would result in its conviction?
A: I'd consider (in other words, I'm talking for myself and not others) the following in addition to whatever else made itself present at whatever good time it did (i.e., often unplanned things come to mind and heart, and I don't suppress that or subject it to some predetermined checklist or template. With that in mind, the following is meant to be helpful, but not suggestive that it's exhaustive, or that it should be necessarily or sweepingly applied):
Considerations: The competency of the investigation that led to the charge; the constitutionality of the proceedings; the prejudicial effect of the charge itself; the defendant's admissible criminal background; witness "credibility;" preconceived notions, characterizations, narratives, stereotypes, etc., that the fact finder carries and tries to impose (for instance, a person testifying on the stand while wearing a police uniform could induce some jury members to be "impressed" by their own romanticized view of police, and by effect, presuppose the veracity (and validity) of that person's testimony (which would presumably come at the expense of a Defendant --since that's the typical adversarial pairing). Other things include the exchange between the court and the attorneys, litigants, parties, etc., which could also have an effect: juries at times, view courts in (m/p)aternalistic (culturally adopted or learned) ways; and thus, if the court has a tense or disfavored exchange with an attorney or one of the parties, some jurors can be tempted to view that as "offensive" to the relationship they "constructed" with the court; or in an attempt to preserve the appearance of their solidarity with the court (in hopes that displaying as much would help avoid the court's disapproval of them), those same jurors may be tempted to "share" in what they (mis)interpret as the court's disapproval of that party or attorney (which is also known as deferring to insecurity...). This is where the want to be accepted, and a culturally adopted fear of the court, team up with a selfish "better them than me" approach that exploits the accused, and produces an unjust and certainly ironic result: the fact finding function being interfered with by... the fact finders --and this too is something I wouldn't ignore).
Other things to take into account (somewhat transactional) include: the cost of prosecuting the case, which isn't ignored by the prosecution when determining whether to, and what type of plea to offer/accept. Further, I'd also consider the jurisdiction of your case (and the local habits of admissibility, sentencing, etc.). There are no guarantees in this context; indeed, the assessment as to the strength of a case, and even the factors used to determine as much can vary from one attorney to another. Notwithstanding that, it should not be beyond the dignity of any attorney to give every case, the same thorough examination that they would appreciate, if it was them or their loved ones facing criminal prosecution.
For more --or specific-- information as to what can be done in your case, give me a call: (702) 449 - 1289. I'll evaluate your individual matter thoroughly, and confidentially.
Q: I didn't do anything and I was still charged with Resisting... is that legal?
It can be: Although the law proscribes or prohibits conduct that it deems an obstruction (i.e., an interference with a police function), failure to comply with police instructions satisfies that standard. Accordingly, although the law doesn't state it explicitly, it amounts to an affirmative obligation on your part to comply with given instructions: it's not just a bar against the commission of some action; it also includes inaction --to the extent that it conflicts with a given instruction (for example, if the police tell you to "get out of a car," and you don't get out of the car, and you're otherwise "not doing anything illegal," you'd be in violation of the "get out of the car" instruction for failing to comply with it; and that plainly constitutes "obstruction" with the given instruction --which would satisfy a "Resisting/Obstructing" charge). So, "not doing anything" can constitute "Resisting/Obstructing" --to the extent that it conflicted with a police given instruction; and therefore, the same can warrant a "resisting" charge.
Q: If I do what the police tell me to, does that hurt my future suit against the police for their misconduct?
Absolutely not (barring the theoretical absurdity that the police instruction was to not file a civil action). The effect of complying with a police instruction does not forfeit a subsequent legal challenge to its validity. It also doesn't give rise to the inference that you are somehow --as a legal matter-- waiving your right to challenge the validity of the the instruction, interaction, or stop, or any aspect of the exchange during which the alleged police misconduct (i.e., the excessive or unwarranted police force or intrusion) occurred. In other words, you don't give up your legal right to challenge the misconduct by simply complying with instructions that are given during the course of --or constitute part of-- it (the alleged police misconduct). Rather, complying with a police instruction can help preserve your claim, by doing away with the counterargument that the police force used wasn't excessive, but rather, "proportionate and reasonably necessary" in light of your noncompliance with the police instruction (which can be considered a threat to the preservation of public and officer safety; and therefore, the same can be used to excuse the police force that could have otherwise been considered "excessive" in the absence of your noncompliance (i.e., the circumstances that would have warranted that type of police reaction). So, not only does complying with a police instruction not hurt your civil action against the police for their alleged misconduct, your compliance with police instructions can actually help preserve your claim by barring deflecting (and perhaps exploiting) reconstructions and defenses that can have an undermining effect on your civil suit against the police for their (alleged) misconduct).
Q: Should I talk to the police (and if I don't answer questions that they ask, wouldn't I be violating the "comply with police instructions" requirement)?
A: No: As a legal matter, the "following police instructions" requirement doesn't extend to answering their questions beyond the "reasonable suspicion" context, during which you have to tell the police your name when asked (pursuant to a U.S. Supreme Court case that introduced this minimal requirement (which also happens to avoid litigation). In principle, you have to tell the police your name when asked, in the presence of "reasonable suspicion" (a legal term of art that we can expand upon during a brief conversation...). But outside of that scope, and as a logical matter, police questions don't self impose an obligation to answer them: the object of a question doesn't translate into an obligation that it be answered without a separate command to that effect; and even then, you're only legally required to provide your name in certain legally pronounced settings.
As to the initial part of the question (should you talk to the police...), barring your counsel giving you advice to the contrary (presumably, in light of his or her familiarity with the specific circumstances of your case), no, you should not talk to the police where you're suspected of committing the investigated criminal activity. And the reason for the rule, is no less familiar to the public than the rule itself: talking to the police can come at your legal expense i.e., "Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law..." see Miranda (Obvious-sounding answers aren't always right, but this one is).
Q: What are Miranda rights:
The popular doctrine commonly referred to as "Miranda" was developed in 1966 in a case called Miranda v. Arizona. Its purpose was to guard against the use of coercion by government officials against those suspected of, or having information about criminal activity.
And like many other rules, this arose out of the type of misconduct it's designed to prevent: Following a litany of reported physical abuses by the police during interrogations, the judiciary seized on the opportunity in Miranda to craft the following bright line rule:
In the custodial interrogation context, police (or other government agent(s)) are required to communicate the following invocable rights:
(i) the right to remain silent --which ironically, can be invoked by not remaining silent (i.e., you can trigger the right to remain silent by saying you "invoke the right..."); and
(ii) your right to talk to an attorney before --or rather than-- answering any police questions, which is likewise prompted by a communication to that effect. As to the duration of the latter, there's case law that establishes a 14 day period during which the police or another government agent cannot (re)initiate communication with you after the right has been invoked.
Failure to observe these rights can result in the inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of it (and there are a number of tests that must be satisfied in order to establish a "custodial interrogation" context (i.e., the lawful setting demanding of Miranda rights), and there are multiple tests with several requirements used to determine the presence, validity, and duration of an invoked Miranda right (hence, the use of "can" as opposed to "must" when referring to the potential inadmissibility of evidence related to an alleged Miranda violation).
Q: Inadvertently waiving Miranda:
Waiving Miranda rights, or not applying them (by either not asserting them or initiating a discussion with the police or another government agent after having previously asserted them/your Miranda rights) has the legal effect of waiving those previously asserted rights, by way of an inference well within the objective standard used to determine a waiver's incidence and validity. And this also comes with the legal obligation that the same be done voluntarily, knowingly, etc. But this doesn’t mean Miranda rights cannot be waived -- practically speaking- inadvertently: it may seem like a contradiction in terms (on the surface: waving a right that must be done so "knowingly," but that can also be done inadvertently)... But these two concepts do not conflict with one another; and this is clarified with the emergence of an important distinction: the difference between knowing the right that you’re waiving, and knowingly waiving that right:
As a modest, but relevant background to help explain this, Miranda wasn’t concerned with insulating suspects from liability or ensuring their legal interests (in other words, the premise wasn't to prevent you from getting in legal trouble). Rather, it was crafted to prevent governmental coercion of those suspected of committing --or having information about-- criminal activity; and the protections afforded to suspects reflect this purpose. Correspondingly, those legal protections don't extend beyond the boundary of that same purpose; and therefore, in the absence of governmental coercion (e.g., police trying to force you to tell them something), your inadvertent waiver of Miranda (Miranda rights) by voluntarily initiating communication with the police that can come at your legal expense, wouldn’t conflict with the principle purpose or protection of your Miranda rights, or its specific instruction that you 'knowingly' waive the right where you voluntarily --albeit inadvertently -- waived the right that you knew (And as to questions as to whether you knew of your Miranda rights, it's inferred from you being exposed to its recitation (again, by way of an inference well within the objective standard used to determine a waiver's incidence and validity...).
Can a "Felony - Firearm" charge result from a "felon in possession of a firearm" charge?
Yes. The "possession of a firearm by a felon" (also known as "felony possession") charge, which in a reader-friendly oversimplification can be described as "possessing a firearm while having a felony conviction," can be, and often is treated as the predicate offense (the underlying felony) supplying a different felony: "Felony Firearm" charge.
A "felony firearm" charge (by contrast to a charge of "felony possession") refers to the commission of a felony while possessing a firearm (which is clearly distinguishable from a felon possessing a firearm): the unlawfulness in "felony firearm" is drawn from the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, rather than from possessing a firearm while having the status of a "felon." However, for purposes of sustatining a felony firearm conviction --which requires the commission of a (separate) felony, a "felon possessing a firearm" constitutes that separate felony; and therefore, the same can be used to supply the required felony in order to sustain a conviction for "felony firearm."
To help understand the meaning and difference of each offense, assume as a premise that we're talking about the uncontested, unlawful felony posession of a firearm, but for two different reasons --each giving rise to two different crimes:
(i) "Felony Possession:" possessing a firearm while having a felony conviction (i.e., felons cannot lawfully posess firearms); and
(ii) "Felony firearm:" possessing a firearm while committing a felony (i.e., possessing a firearm during the act or commission of a felony).
Without question, these charges are clearly distinct: the unlawfulness in "Felony Possession" is drawn from possessing a firearm while having a felony conviction (i.e., while being considered a "felon"); while "Felony firearm" is satisfied by committing a felony while possessing a firearm (i.e., independent from whether the party charged is a convicted felon. However, for purposes of satisfying the act or commission of a felony in (ii) "Felony firearm," the possesion charge in (i) "felony possession" can be used to supply the required felony in (ii).
In other words (and perhaps at the expense of being somewhat redundant - although it seems like a small price to pay to be helpful), once you've established the "unlawful posession of a firearm by a felon," you've assumed the commission of a felony; and that felony is used to supply the underlying requirement in "Felony firearm" (that a felony was committed by the accused while possessing a firearm). The felony that was committed was the unlawful "possession of a firearm by a felon."
In light of the relative ease and lending effect that one charge has on the other, it's hardly surprising to see prosecutors charge someone with both (separate) charges in succeeding fashion; but in the same breath, a constitutional (procedural, merit based, fact finder or forum based, etc.) challenge to the validity of the prosecution of either charge can likewise invalidate both charges-- often to the extent that the predicate supplying charge is itself invalidated...
What are deferral/diversionary programs?
Deferral or diversionary programs are used interchangeably (technically, mistakenly since the two terms mean different things) to loosely refer to legislative schemes (in the legal, rather than the pejorative sense) and/or court backed programs designed to grant leniency towards eligible criminal offenders, including youthful offenders and/or defendants who either don't have any or certain types of prior convictions, etc..
Typically, the application of these programs serve as an alternative to an otherwise applicable general consequence (ordinary effect), or some specific (typically punitive) provision in a statute that the court would otherwise impose, and in some instances, may be bound to follow (criminal statutes have punitive provisions (subparts in a criminal statute that speak to the applicable punishment that a court can impose when sentencing, requiring courts to sentence people to the terms contained within the statutory language).
As an example of a conviction-sparring criminal statute, take "7411" treatment (statutory shorthand for a specific deferral treatment, which if granted, allows 1st time drug possession offenders/defendants to plead legally guilty, and not have a resulting criminal conviction for the drug possession --to the extent that they satisfy all the court ordered requirements). In the absence of such a program, a guilty plea would remain on a convicted defendant's record until it was either successfully challenged (appealed) or expunged. But by applying the 7411 grant, the defendant would not need to rely on some extrinsic legal vehicle to obtain relief at a later time; rather, the relief would come via the opportunity to NOT have a criminal conviction, as opposed to having one, then looking for some post conviction challenge or action to remove it: the benefit is initially obtained; and it extends well beyond job --and arguably social-- marketability, etc.). Accordingly, it's advisable to at least scan the availability of deferral programs and examine a defendant's (not to be too formal, but more accurately: prospective applicant's) eligibility to help shield them from things that can hurt them...
There are a number of statutory and judicial mechanisms (e.g., H.Y.T.A., MIP, DV, Drug Possession, specialty courts (e.g., DUI, mental health, veterans court, etc.); delayed sentences and other fashionable legal relief) applying to --and requiring-- different things (e.g., some programs require offenders to be of a certain age and/or not have any or certain prior convictions; and some have varying provisions within the same statute (e.g., HYTA doesn't require prosecutorial consent as long as the applicant is between 17 and 21, yet it does require prosecutorial consent for applicants between 21 and 24 years of age, etc.). In addition to those differences, certain courts also differ as to petitioning requirements citing statutory requirements that some courts demand more than others, although the lack of certain requirements on its face doesn't translate into reversible or prejudicial error for appellate purposes).
For more information on whether you're eligible for any available program, give me a call: (702) 449 - 1289.
We'll discuss your case, and scan the landscape of available programs, for which you're eligible...
Can criminal records be expunged?
Yes -- to the extent that your record qualifies. Note, there have been recent legislative changes that have taken effect on January, 2015 that can have an effect on your eligibility (but the changes have been carefully analyzed with the aid of a talented colleague, Melissa Patrick, who's versed enough to have been requested to present on the topic in a recent event designed to educate the public and other attorneys). For more information, give me a call; and I'll examine whether your record qualifies.
Note: if I'm retained to represent you on a criminal matter, for which you completed all court ordered requirements, and if you otherwise qualify for an expungement, I'll file a motion to have your record expunged free of charge. The idea for offering free expungements to former clients who complete court ordered requirements came from Lisa Babcock: a good lawyer and friend.
For an expansive discussion as to sentencing thresholds and parameters; leniency; enhancement penalty/subsequent offender statutes; habitual status; jurisdiction at sentencing; effect and scope of sentencing agreements and pretrial condition requirements on sentencing agreements, etc. give me a call: (702) 449 - 1289, and we'll discuss these topics and their applicability to your matter.
What is probation?
Probation, often considered an act of grace, is a judicial grant of leniency offering eligible defendants an alternative to going to jail or prison (ordered during the sentencing stage of a criminal proceeding). In its practical sense, it translates into conditional liberty: it allows defendants to enjoy restricted freedom. And typically, this restriction comes by way of conditions designed to deliver defendants from the type of behavior that led to the underlying conviction (for which they were granted probation). These conditions include defendants/probation grantees both doing, and not doing things (e.g., the courts can require a defendant convicted with a DUI/DWI to not get into any other legal trouble, not use or be around drugs and/or alcohol (depending on what substance informed their intoxication), etc.). And the courts can also impose affirmative obligations (duties that defendants must do and complete); for instance (drawing off the previous hypothetical): The courts can require someone to attend and complete certain counseling and related programs that include components designed to deter the incidence of DUI's, undergo random drug and/or alcohol tests, report to a probation department/officers, pay costs/fines and applicable restitution, obtain employment, complete a school degree, etc. Completion of probation (throughout its application --the maximum length of which is also set by statute, and the specific terms of which are ordered by a court), requires defendants to satisfy all court ordered requirements (its terms and conditions must be discharged as interpreted by a probation officer's conclusion, and if challenged, then a court's conclusion beyond a preponderance of the evidence). A failure to discharge any of these obligations can translate into an alleged probation violation that can turn into probation revocation),
What is a probation violation?
The term self describes: Probation violations are violations of probationary terms (i.e., defendants granted probation are required to do and not do things, and to the extent that they don't meet those requirements, probation violations allegedly occur).
Does someone accused of violating probation have a right to a hearing?
Yes; however, the equally important question is "what type of hearing do they have a right to" --and an important sub-component of which includes: "what's the relevant standard for proving culpability?" The standard for proving that the accused violated probation is "by preponderance of the evidence," or as a late law school professor and friend used to say, "not 51%... But anything above 50% (e.g., 50.001% would suffice." (Prof. "Filli"). In other words, the bar for a fact finder to establish that a violation occurred requires only that the fact finder (which generally means (or more precisely, refers to) the "decider," which can be a court or a jury, but in the probation violation hearing context, the "fact finder" translates into a court as opposed to a court OR jury) sustain that it was more likely than not, that the violation occurred. Note, this "by a preponderance" standard is distinctly less burdensome than the standard of proof in an ordinary criminal trial, which requires the fact finder to find "beyond a reasonable doubt," that every required element of the charged offense occurred. So, although you do have a right to a hearing, don't assume that the type of hearing mirrors an ordinary criminal trial. To illustrate this distinction, consider the following example:
Someone can be both found guilty of violating a term of their probation for allegedly committing a criminal act that in of itself, did not yield a criminal conviction. In other words, the same alleged conduct that may not result in a criminal conviction (i.e., that was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a fact finder or the "decider"), may very well constitute a violation of probation (a fact finder can conclude that a violation for the same offense that wasn't established in its own separate proceeding (criminal trial), occurred beyond a preponderance of the evidence for purposes of establishing a probation violation). For example, assume you're on probation, and one of its terms requires you to "stay out of legal trouble." However, you end up getting charged with criminal assault as a result of you allegedly committing the charged act --which clearly constitutes "getting into legal trouble;" and therefore, conflicts with the probation requirement. Further assume that the independent criminal case aimed at prosecuting you for the assault (outside the scope of your probation) wasn't proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of a fact finder (in its separate criminal proceeding, and therefore you were found "not guilty"). But your probation officer gets wind of the allegations against you, and files probation violation allegations against you (accusing you of violating your probation) for the same alleged conduct for which you were not convicted. Despite the object of that allegation (i.e., the criminal assault) not resulting in a criminal conviction in its separate proceeding (which can also be used to support your defending claim against an allegation of violating probation; for instance, by pointing to an acquittal of the underlying offense in its separate proceeding as some evidence that the charged offense didn't occur -although you'd be trying to disprove a negative), you can still be found guilty of violating probation (i.e., that you committed the alleged assault) --as long as the court determines that you violated probation (assaulted another person) "beyond a preponderance of the evidence." With that said, evaluate your probation violation carefully and independently from its underlying separate criminal proceeding (to the extent that it has one); and don't assume that having "a right to a hearing" constitutes a trial, or necessarily translates into equivalent legal relief.
Can someone's probation be violated, but not revoked?
Yes: Picking up on the answer to the previous question of "what is probation," and what constitutes its "violation," probation revocation represents the termination of probation.
This typically results in the inapplicability of a previously granted deferral program, in addition to the imposition of the balance of your suspended jail or prison sentence (i.e., the amount of incarceration you avoided as a consequence of your initial grant of probation). Inherently, revocations are more severe than violations: violations represent a formal, judicial acknowledgment that at least one term of probation wasn't complied with (which isn't to diminish the effect of a violation: violations can influence your current probation and future grants of probation, including the type and terms of probation granted. And as to effects on your current probation: the court can extend your term of probation and/or add requirements); and violations can also result in the imposition of incarceration or imprisonment (it's loosely viewed as a corrective tool, which may be the case, but if you look closely, the failure to comply with a current probation term can be indicative of a likelihood of satisfying another or subsequent term or grant of probation (they are each separate considerations, and I'm not suggesting that a prior revocation can be used to measure or predict the likelihood of satisfying a current grant, as much as I'm saying that punishment for failing to comply with a prior condition doesn't necessarily have any more of a predicting effect than the failure to comply with prior conditions of probation, which were the reason for the punishment.
Revocations on the other hand, represent a full removal of probation leaving you legally exposed to the brunt of the initial sentence (which typically exceeds probation violation sentences by far). For example, if you were sentenced to 2 years in prison, but that sentence was suspended pending your successful completion of probation for the same period, and during probation you made some mistakes (i.e., you failed to comply with a reporting requirement), those mistakes may be viewed as "violations," for which you may be sentenced to jail (e.g., a couple of days, 1 week; 1 month, etc.), to the extent that you're sentenced to jail at all (and you'd presumably keep whatever deferral program was granted during sentencing of the underlying offense for which you were granted probation if it applied). However, using the same set of circumstances, should your probation be revoked (e.g., should your mistakes exhaust the court's patience (by type, amount or degree or perhaps a court's impatience), or be viewed as frustrating the judicial objectives that support your probation grant (and these reasons aren't to suggest they're the burden by which revocations are measured; rather they're just some examples), then your probation would be removed completely (presumably along with whatever deferral program you enjoyed). And the additional effect of that is to have you possibly serve the initial 2 year prison sentence. To be clear, this is only one example, but it's not unrepresentative of the legal and practical effects that can follow from a probation revocation).
"I know someone who..."
"My non lawyer friend, person I met in jail, my accountant, my hairdresser, etc., gave me legal advice… he/she/they said…"
In the 1980's the Miami Hurricanes had an unprecedented run of dominance in the college football context. Those teams redefined college football on and off the field... This piece of information is as helpful to your case as your non-lawyer friend's legal advice. If you're sick, seek the aid of a doctor; if you want legal advice, seek the advice of a lawyer; and if you want good legal advice and representation, you'll call: 702-449-1289, Barnet G. LeVine, Esq. (Attorney at Law, Barnet G. LeVine, PLLC.
Thanks for your time; and I look forward. . . to helping you move forward.
Barnet G. LeVine, Esq.
(702) 449 - 1289
In all my ears of experience...
one time at band camp.....
Resisting and Obstructing